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Sovereigns in Distress: 
Do They Need Bankruptcy?
SHOULD THERE BE a sovereign bankruptcy procedure for countries in
ﬁnancial distress? This paper explores the use of U.S. bankruptcy law as a
model for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure and asks whether adoption of
such a procedure would lead to a more orderly process of sovereign debt
restructuring. It assumes that a quick and orderly debt restructuring
process is more efﬁcient than a prolonged and disorderly one, because a
lengthy process of debt restructuring takes a high toll on debtor countries’
economies as well as harming creditors in general. I concentrate on three
goals for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure: preventing individual credi-
tors or groups of creditors from suing the debtor for repayment, prevent-
ing groups of creditors from strategically delaying negotiations or acting
as holdouts, and increasing the likelihood that private creditors will pro-
vide new loans to sovereign debtors in ﬁnancial distress, thus reducing the
pressure on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to fund bailouts. I
conclude that nonbankruptcy alternatives are less likely to accomplish
these goals than a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. 
U.S. Bankruptcy Law and Important Trade-Offs in Bankruptcy
Three sections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are of possible relevance
for a future international bankruptcy procedure: Chapter 7 (bankruptcy
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0675-07 BPEA/White  7/22/02  1:12 PM  Page 287liquidation), Chapter 11 (corporate reorganization), and Chapter 9 (munic-
ipal bankruptcy).
Chapter 7
Chapter 7 is the U.S. bankruptcy liquidation procedure for both corpo-
rations and individuals. When a corporation ﬁles under Chapter 7, its
operations are shut down and the corporation ceases to exist. Its assets are
liquidated and the proceeds distributed among creditors according to the
absolute priority rule (APR, described below). When an individual ﬁles
under Chapter 7, his or her assets are divided into exempt and nonexempt
categories. Nonexempt assets are liquidated and the proceeds distributed
among creditors according to the APR. The individual’s postbankruptcy
earnings are completely exempt from the obligation to repay prebank-
ruptcy debt. For both individuals and corporations, any debt not repaid by
the liquidation procedure is discharged.1
Under the APR the administrative expenses of bankruptcy are paid
ﬁrst, unsecured creditors second, and anything left goes to equity hold-
ers.2 Each class of creditors must be paid in full before lower-ranking
classes receive anything. Unsecured creditors’ claims may be divided into
subclasses if their contracts with the ﬁrm contain subordination agree-
ments, but otherwise all of their claims are treated equally. Claims due in
the future (such as long-term bonds) are accelerated to the present. Thus
bankruptcy liquidation is a collective procedure aimed at resolving all
claims against the debtor.
An important advantage of a bankruptcy procedure, whether it involves
liquidation or reorganization, is that it reduces creditors’ incentives to
engage in a race to seize the debtor’s assets. As in a bank run, when indi-
vidual creditors perceive that the debtor’s assets are insufﬁcient to repay
all of its debts, they have an incentive to race to be repaid before the
debtor’s funds run out. Such a grab race is destructive, because it results
in particular assets of the debtor being liquidated in order to satisfy the
winners’ claims, even though the debtor’s assets may be more valuable if
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1. Bankruptcy thus limits the obligation of individuals to repay personal debt or debt of
their unincorporated businesses in the same way that limited liability limits the obligation
of corporate shareholders to repay corporate debt.
2. Secured creditors are outside the priority ordering, and in liquidation they reclaim
the assets securing their loans. Priority claims, including claims for unpaid taxes and
wages, are paid after administrative expenses but before unsecured claims.
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ducing goods if a creditor seizes its main computer, even though it still
has all of its other equipment. In the sovereign debt context, a debtor
country’s manufacturing sector may suffer because it cannot import fuel
if a creditor attaches the country’s external bank account. The point of the
bankruptcy procedure is to reduce creditors’ incentive to race for payment
by resolving all of the ﬁrm’s debts at once. If creditors know that winning
a grab race will cause the ﬁrm to ﬁle for bankruptcy, they will have little
incentive to enter the race at all, because doing so will not increase their
reward unless they win early enough to collect without tipping the debtor
into bankruptcy.3
The race by creditors to be first to collect from a failing firm is an
example of a prisoners’ dilemma. To illustrate, suppose a firm has two
creditors of equal priority: creditor 1, who is owed 5, and creditor 2, who
is owed 4. Suppose further that, if one or both creditors race to collect
first, the firm’s assets will be liquidated piecemeal and will be worth 5 in
total. As figure 1 shows, if creditor 1 races to collect but creditor 2 does
not, creditor 1 gets full repayment of 5 and creditor 2 gets zero, whereas
if creditor 2 races to collect but creditor 1 does not, creditor 2 gets full
repayment of 4 and creditor 1 gets 1. Now suppose that if both creditors
race to be first, the expected outcome is that creditor 1 gets 3 and credi-
tor 2 gets 2, and that if both creditors agree not to race against each other,
the firm’s assets will be worth 7 rather than 5. Under these assumptions
the assets are worth more when creditors do not race; in practice this
could be because they are sold all at once rather than piecemeal or
because they are sold when they have maximum value. If neither creditor
races, then, because both have equal priority, each is paid seven-ninths of
its claims: creditor 1 receives 3.9 and creditor 2 receives 3.1. Although
the creditors together are better off in the no-race outcome, each is worse
off than if it wins the grab race, and thus the only equilibrium of the
game is that both creditors race. 
In this context we can interpret bankruptcy liquidation as a mandatory
procedure that imposes the outcome that neither creditor races (the
“no-race/no-race” outcome), since both creditors’ attempts to collect are
stayed by the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy ﬁling. The resulting increase in the value
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3. Even this may not work, because the bankruptcy trustee can void payments made to
creditors within a ﬁxed time interval before the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy ﬁling; such payments are
known as “preferential transfers” (Jackson, 1986).
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as a mandatory collective procedure.4
Now consider the analogy between creditors in a grab race and deposi-
tors in a bank run. Both actions result from individuals’ incentive to pro-
tect their own claims when the debtor’s total assets are (or are perceived
to be) less than its total liabilities. In bankruptcy, the APR does not
promise full repayment of creditors’ claims, but only to divide the assets
according to a predetermined procedure. However, in a bank run, the
usual solution is for the deposit insurer to reimburse depositors for the full
amount of their deposits. Such a bailout would substitute payouts of 5 to
creditor 1 and 4 to creditor 2 for the payouts of 3.9 and 3.1 in the upper
left box of ﬁgure 1. With these payouts, the no-race/no-race outcome is a
possible equilibrium of the game, since creditor 1 is indifferent between
racing and not racing when creditor 2 chooses not to race, and creditor 2
is indifferent between racing and not racing when creditor 1 chooses not
to race. Thus the no-race/no-race outcome and the race/race outcome are
both possible. Because no-race/no-race is a possible equilibrium of the
game, bailouts are a possible solution to the problem of bank runs or cred-
itor grab races. However, the analogy of bankruptcy and bank runs sug-
gests that the problem could instead be solved by substituting bankruptcy
for a bailout. 
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4. In the United Kingdom, private creditors liquidate failing ﬁrms’ assets individually
rather than collectively, and failing ﬁrms are thought to shut down prematurely as a result
(see Webb, 1991, for a discussion).
Figure 1. Payoff Matrix for Creditors Choosing Whether to Race to Collect from a
Bankrupt Debtora
Source: Author’s model as described in the text.
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debtor countries’ access to new loans, even when debtors are likely to
default or have already defaulted on their sovereign debt. The priority rule
in bankruptcy, that is, the order in which creditors are paid, is an impor-
tant determinant of the availability of new loans to ﬁrms in ﬁnancial dis-
tress, because later loans have external effects on earlier loans, and these
externalities affect creditors’ willingness to lend. Consider the “me-ﬁrst”
rule, which speciﬁes that, in a bankruptcy, loans are repaid in full in
chronological order: the ﬁrst to lend is ﬁrst in line for repayment. Under
this rule, later loans have no direct external effect on the value of earlier
loans, because earlier loans are repaid in full before later loans receive
anything.5 As a result, late lending is unattractive to creditors because
their claims are unlikely to be repaid, but early lending is attractive. Now
consider the “last lender ﬁrst” rule, which speciﬁes that loans are repaid in
reverse chronological order. Under this rule, late loans reduce the value of
early loans, because late loans must be fully repaid before early loans
receive anything. Relative to the “me-ﬁrst” rule, late lending is attractive,
but early lending is not. Finally, the “pari passu” or equal priority rule is
in between. Under this rule, late loans reduce the value of early loans, but
not by as much as under the “last lender ﬁrst” rule.6 U.S. ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
distress often obtain late loans by giving late creditors secured interests in
particular assets, which is equivalent to using the “last lender ﬁrst” rule.
In contrast, countries in ﬁnancial distress ﬁnd it much more difﬁcult to
obtain late loans, both because all loans have equal priority and because
sovereign debtors cannot provide security to late lenders. 
Liquidation is potentially an important component of a sovereign
bankruptcy procedure. Distressed countries would not disappear from the
world map if they liquidated in bankruptcy. Rather, a liquidation proce-
dure for countries would be similar to the liquidation procedure for indi-
viduals in the United States. The country’s assets held abroad would be
divided into exempt and nonexempt categories, based on whether the
asset is covered by sovereign immunity. In the United States and the
United Kingdom, sovereigns’ diplomatic assets are covered by sovereign
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5. However, if late loans allow the ﬁrm to avoid bankruptcy, and it then engages in
risky investments, the value of early loans may fall. 
6. See Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1989) for models of the bankruptcy deci-
sion that demonstrate the effects of priority rules and show that no priority rule always
gives managers incentives to make efﬁcient bankruptcy decisions. 
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ereign immunity would be liquidated and the proceeds used to repay the
country’s creditors according to the APR. Any debt not repaid from the
sale of nonexempt assets would be discharged. All of the country’s assets
held at home would be covered by the country’s own law and would pre-
sumably be exempt. The country’s postbankruptcy “earnings” (that is, tax
revenue) would also be exempt. I argue below that a liquidation procedure
along the lines of Chapter 7 would be a useful component of a sovereign
bankruptcy procedure, as an alternative to be used if negotiations over a
restructuring plan break down. 
Chapter 11
Chapter 11 is the U.S. reorganization procedure for corporations, and
most sovereign bankruptcy proposals are more or less based on it.7 It
allows corporations to continue operating and to repay part or all of their
creditors’ claims from future earnings, rather than shut down and repay
creditors from the proceeds of liquidating their assets. Managers have the
right to choose between ﬁling under Chapter 7 and ﬁling under Chapter 11.
Under Chapter 11, existing managers of corporations usually remain in
control as “debtors in possession.” The bankruptcy judge loosely oversees
the manager, because the judge must approve any major changes such as
new loans or sales of assets. 
Several provisions of Chapter 11 are intended to help the corporation
survive by improving its short-term ﬁnancial situation. First, there is an
automatic stay on prebankruptcy litigation in which the ﬁrm is a defen-
dant. Chapter 11 also prevents creditors from ﬁling new lawsuits against
the ﬁrm after the bankruptcy ﬁling. Litigation against the ﬁrm is often
transferred to the bankruptcy court and decided by the bankruptcy judge
as part of the bankruptcy proceedings. Second, ﬁrms in Chapter 11 cease
paying interest on unsecured debt until the reorganization plan is adopted
and then make payments according to the terms of the plan. This reduces
both the immediate and the longer-term ﬁnancial demands on ﬁrms in
bankruptcy. Third, ﬁrms can usually obtain new loans—known as debtor-
in-possession ﬁnancing—because postpetition loans take priority over all
292 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
7. See White (1998) for a discussion of Chapter 11. For a comparison of reorganization
procedures in the United States with those in various European countries, see White (1996b). 
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makes lending to ﬁrms in Chapter 11 very attractive.8
Managers have the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan for
four months after the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy, and often the bankruptcy
judge extends the exclusivity period. The reorganization plan speciﬁes
how much each class of creditors will receive in cash and new claims on
the reorganized ﬁrm. Assuming that the ﬁrm’s assets are worth more in
reorganization than in liquidation, Chapter 11 provides a framework
within which creditors and managers can bargain over the distribution of
the extra value. If and when the bankruptcy judge ends the managers’
exclusivity period, creditors may propose their own reorganization plan.
But often managers succeed in persuading the judge to extend the exclu-
sivity period long enough that creditors never have an opportunity to offer
their own plans. 
Reorganization plans are voted on, and the requirement for acceptance
is that each class of creditors must approve the plan by a margin of at least
two-thirds in amount and a simple majority in number of claims. Two-
thirds of equity must also vote in favor of the plan. Thus the Chapter 11
voting procedure incorporates a mechanism for compelling dissenting
creditors to accept a reorganization plan as long as they constitute less
than a speciﬁed minority of each class. 
An important aspect of bankruptcy reorganization is the alternative
procedure that is followed when no reorganization plan is adopted by
vote. The bankruptcy judge makes this decision. The judge may order the
ﬁrm to be liquidated under Chapter 7. Or the judge may adopt the reorga-
nization plan even though it failed the voting test, using a procedure
called “cramdown.” The requirements for cramdown are that at least one
class of impaired creditors meet the voting margin for adoption of the
plan, that each class of creditors receive at least what the class would have
received in liquidation, and that any class of unsecured creditors that
rejected the plan be repaid in full or else lower-ranking classes of credi-
tors cannot receive anything. Note that if all creditors had equal priority
(as they would in sovereign bankruptcies), the latter test requires only that
all classes of creditors receive at least what they would get in liquidation.
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8. An additional feature of Chapter 11 is that secured creditors cannot remove assets on
which they have liens while the ﬁrm is in Chapter 11 (although the value of their claims
must be protected). 
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bankruptcy, because it allows a reorganization plan to be adopted despite
the opposition of entire classes of creditors.9
Chapter 11 is highly favorable to managers and equity holders of ﬁnan-
cially distressed ﬁrms, because managers remain in control while their
ﬁrms go through the procedure, and equity remains intact as long as the
reorganization plan is adopted by vote. There is an important trade-off in
making bankruptcy reorganization favorable to managers and equity. One
side of the trade-off is that managers otherwise might engage in activities
that are destructive to the ﬁrm, because they have strong incentives to
avoid bankruptcy. For example, managers might seek to gain from taking
the ﬁrm’s cash to Las Vegas, where a high-stakes gamble would save the
ﬁrm from bankruptcy if it wins and cost managers little if it loses, since
they would lose their jobs anyway if the ﬁrm went bankrupt.10 Alterna-
tively, managers might loot the ﬁrm’s assets before ﬁling for bankruptcy
or delay ﬁling until all of the ﬁrm’s assets have been used up. Thus a gain
from having a bankruptcy procedure that treats managers favorably is that
their ﬁrms enter bankruptcy in better ﬁnancial shape and are therefore
more likely to be saved. 
But the other side of the trade-off is that, when the bankruptcy proce-
dure is favorable to managers, they have an incentive to ﬁle too often. The
models illustrating this point assume that there are two types of ﬁrms, sol-
vent and insolvent, and creditors cannot distinguish between them at the
time they ﬁle for bankruptcy. All managers of insolvent ﬁrms ﬁle to reor-
ganize under Chapter 11, whereas managers of solvent ﬁrms choose
whether to ﬁle under Chapter 11 or to avoid bankruptcy and repay their
creditors in full. All managers of ﬁrms in Chapter 11 offer reorganization
plans that reduce creditors’ claims by the same proportion, and creditors
must decide whether to accept or reject these plans without knowing to
which category a ﬁrm belongs. If the proportion of insolvent ﬁrms among
those in bankruptcy is large enough, creditors’ best strategy is to accept
all reorganization plans. The reason is that creditors lose when they reject
294 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
9. Note that the term “cramdown” is sometimes used in the sovereign debt context to
refer to a collective action clause, discussed below. Here I use it in the bankruptcy sense to
indicate a mechanism for overriding entire classes of creditors. Adoption of a reorganiza-
tion plan using cramdown takes longer and involves higher transactions costs than adoption
by the voting procedure. 
10. See Stiglitz (1972). 
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agers may ﬁle under Chapter 11 and reorganize even though their ﬁrms
are solvent and could afford to repay creditors in full. Similar models sug-
gest that managers may also exert too little effort in managing their ﬁrms
and may choose investments that entrench themselves.11
Both sides of the trade-off also apply to sovereign default. During the
East Asian crisis, public ofﬁcials in several countries went to extraordi-
nary lengths to defend the value of their currencies and avoid running out
of foreign exchange, in the process causing domestic businesses to fail
and their economies to go into deep recession.12 Thus there may have
been too few defaults. On the other hand, the theoretical literature on sov-
ereign default emphasizes public ofﬁcials’ incentives to borrow and then
default on their foreign debt, because neither the penalties of exclusion
from credit markets nor those from loss of reputation are severe enough to
make it worthwhile for debtor countries always to repay. The prediction
that sovereign debtors default too often applies regardless of whether the
debtor countries use the borrowed funds for efﬁcient or for wasteful eco-
nomic policies.13
Chapter 9
Chapter 9, the bankruptcy procedure for U.S. municipalities, has been
discussed as a possible model for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure.14
Chapter 9 is based on Chapter 11 but differs in a number of respects. First,
a municipality must obtain permission from its state to ﬁle for bank-
ruptcy, and the ﬁling must be voluntary on the part of municipal ofﬁcials.
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11. See Hart and Moore (1989), Berglof and von Thadden (1994), and White (1998). 
12. See Blustein (2001, p. 87) for a discussion of Indonesia’s response to its ﬁnancial
crisis. 
13. See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Eaton and Fernandez (1995), and Bulow and
Rogoff (1989) for models. 
14. Several aspects of Chapter 9 reﬂect how the U.S. Constitution treats the relation-
ship between states and the federal government. One is that Chapter 9 does not apply to
U.S. states or counties, because these are considered sovereign entities, and the U.S. Con-
stitution prevents the federal government from interfering in the internal governance of
sovereign states or their political subdivisions. Chapter 9 thus applies only to cities, town-
ships, and special entities such as school districts or publicly owned utilities, which are not
sovereign because they are creations of the states. Also, states are not allowed to adopt their
own bankruptcy laws, because the Constitution does not allow states to adopt legislation
that interferes with contracts, and bankruptcy interferes with contracts between municipal-
ities and their creditors. See McConnell and Picker (1993).
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pay debts as they come due, in order to ﬁle for bankruptcy. This is a more
stringent standard than that applied to ﬁrms  ﬁling under Chapter 11.
Before ﬁling, municipalities must attempt to work out a restructuring
plan, although they may ﬁle for bankruptcy if the attempt fails. Third,
public ofﬁcials—unlike managers of corporations—can never be replaced
in bankruptcy, on the grounds that doing so would interfere with sover-
eignty. Fourth, public ofﬁcials always have the exclusive right to offer a
restructuring or reorganization plan. Creditors have the right to form a
committee to negotiate with the public ofﬁcials, but they cannot propose
their own plan. 
Restructuring plans are adopted by a voting procedure similar to that in
Chapter 11 and with the same voting requirements for creditors. If a plan
is not adopted by vote, however, the alternative procedure is ambiguous,
because municipalities cannot be liquidated under Chapter 7. Bankruptcy
judges are allowed to use cramdown to adopt a restructuring plan, but
there is no analogue in Chapter 9 to the various tests that must be satisﬁed
in order to use cramdown under Chapter 11. Another possible alternative
procedure is for the bankruptcy judge to formulate his or her own restruc-
turing plan based on the municipality’s ability to repay. The reorganiza-
tion plan would then require the municipality to raise taxes, sell assets, cut
expenditure, reject collective bargaining agreements, or do whatever else
is necessary to pay for the plan. This has never happened under Chapter 9,
but it could in theory.15 The lack of a clear alternative procedure to be fol-
lowed if negotiations over a restructuring plan break down is also a prob-
lem with proposals for sovereign bankruptcy procedures. 
Chapter 9 provides little guidance for a sovereign bankruptcy proce-
dure because it has been used only rarely. Only three general-purpose
municipalities used the procedure between 1972 and 1984, and all were
very small towns.16 The largest bankruptcy ﬁlings so far under Chapter 9
have been those of Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Orange County, Califor-
nia. Although Bridgeport was running a large budget deﬁcit and had the
highest property tax rate in the state at the time it ﬁled for bankruptcy, the
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15. See McConnell and Picker (1993, p. 465) for discussion of precedents in which
creditors appealed a restructuring plan and the appeals court considered the debtor’s ability
to repay creditors’ claims by raising taxes or making other adjustments. 
16. However, several hundred special-purpose governmental entities such as drainage
districts have used Chapter 9. See McConnell and Picker (1993).
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exhausted its borrowing power and was therefore not insolvent. Bridge-
port’s bankruptcy ﬁling was also opposed by the state of Connecticut,
which had already appointed its own ﬁnancial review board to deal with
Bridgeport’s ﬁnancial distress.17 States have a general interest in prevent-
ing their municipalities from ﬁling for bankruptcy, because allowing one
municipality to ﬁle signals that the state will not bail out other municipal-
ities if they get into ﬁnancial distress, and this in turn raises municipal
borrowing costs within the state. However, when Orange County ﬁled for
bankruptcy in 1994 because of $1.64 billion in losses on investments
made by the county treasurer, California did not attempt to stop it. 
The Orange County bankruptcy experience provides some support for
a sovereign bankruptcy procedure in the sense that the reorganization
process was both orderly and quick. Within one and a half years after the
county ﬁled for bankruptcy, a reorganization plan had been adopted that
called for full repayment of creditors’ claims (excluding lost interest).
This probably would not have been possible without the automatic stay on
litigation and the ﬁnancial relief provided by the suspension of payments
to creditors.18
Thus Chapter 9 provides a precedent for a bankruptcy procedure for
governments in financial distress. However, it provides little guidance
concerning how a sovereign bankruptcy procedure would work in
practice. 
Differences between Sovereign Default and 
Corporate Bankruptcy
How does sovereign default differ from corporate bankruptcy, and why
is the former so costly? First, default by a country often involves a
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17. Bridgeport’s conﬂict with the state of Connecticut is reminiscent of conﬂicts
between the IMF and debtor countries. The state’s ﬁnancial review board was about to
force the city to raise its property taxes by 18 percent when the city ﬁled for bankruptcy.
Bridgeport’s ofﬁcials wanted instead to resolve the city’s ﬁnancial problems by breaking
“burdensome” union contracts. See George Judson, “U.S. Judge Blocks Bridgeport from
Bankruptcy Court,” New York Times, August 2, 1991.
18. Orange County raised funds for the plan by laying off workers, selling some assets,
cutting expenditure, and issuing new bonds. It attempted to raise its local sales tax, but vot-
ers rejected the proposed increase. See “Orange County Adopts Plan to Get out of Bank-
ruptcy,” New York Times, December 22, 1995, p. D2.
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fearful about the country’s prospects and race to sell their ﬁnancial assets
and convert local currency into dollars. This quickly drains the country’s
stock of hard-currency reserves. To stem the outﬂow and reduce the
chance of running out of reserves, countries often raise domestic interest
rates to very high levels. The high interest rates in turn do substantial
damage to the economy. Firms that have borrowed abroad in dollars
default on their loans, because the cost of purchasing dollars with which
to repay those loans has risen sharply. Firms that have borrowed from
local banks in the local currency are likely to default as well, because they
cannot afford to pay the high interest rates. Local banks become insolvent
and cease lending. Firms go bankrupt, workers are laid off, households
cut their consumption, and the country’s economy may go into a severe
recession. Further, events in one country often make investors fearful of
contagion, and they begin to sell ﬁnancial assets in neighboring countries,
causing the problem to spread. Preventing a ﬁnancial crisis from becom-
ing an economic crisis and spreading to other countries is the major rea-
son why the IMF often intervenes in ﬁnancial crises with a bailout. More
generally, this scenario suggests that there is an international public inter-
est in preventing ﬁnancial crises or limiting their severity and spread. But
if politicians and investors anticipate that the IMF will come to the rescue
of countries facing ﬁnancial crises, their incentive to prevent such crises
by following good economic policies or restricting their international bor-
rowing is weakened.
19
Jeffrey Sachs argues that when the restructuring process is prolonged
and debtor countries cannot borrow from abroad, their investment levels
and economic growth rates fall. He also argues that default has a high
political cost, in that elected governments may fall because of voters’
negative reaction to the recession or to the IMF’s demands that the gov-
ernment sharply cut expenditure or increase taxes.20
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19. Preventing contagion is sometimes an issue when large corporations ﬁle for bank-
ruptcy as well. The federal government bailed out the Chrysler Corporation in the 1970s and
arranged for commercial banks to bail out Long-Term Capital Management in the 1990s.
Executives of Enron attempted, although unsuccessfully, to get government help before they
ﬁled for bankruptcy. See Blustein (2001, pp. 305–31) for a discussion of Long-Term Capital
Management, and Richard W. Stevenson, “Enron Sought Aid of Treasury Dept. to Get Bank
Loans,” New York Times, January 12, 2002, p. A1. 
20. Sachs (1989) argues that, when a country defaults, its growth rate falls because it
cannot borrow more until a restructuring plan is agreed on, and this starves the economy of
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able to repay creditors, few assets are available to repay creditors holding
sovereign debt: nearly all of the debtor country’s assets are within its bor-
ders and presumably protected from creditors by domestic law, leaving
only those assets held abroad that are not subject to sovereign immunity
to repay creditors. This tends to make default less costly for debtor coun-
tries than for debtor corporations. On the other hand, when a debtor coun-
try defaults on sovereign debt owed to other countries, the default is
equivalent under international law to violating an international treaty.
Thus the country presumably incurs a stigma greater than that of a private
corporation that ﬁles for bankruptcy. Third, compared with corporate
debt, most sovereign debt has a very simple credit structure: nearly all
loans are unsecured, and all have equal priority if default occurs.21 The
exception is that loans from the IMF and World Bank are treated as hav-
ing priority over other debt. 
One can compare how lenders perceive the risk of default by corpora-
tions versus that by countries. The spread between risky and risk-free debt
measures the expected value of losses due to default. The spread between
interest rates on bonds rated Baa by Moody’s and those on thirty-year
U.S. government bonds, given in the left-hand column of table 1 for the
1990s, measures the expected cost of default by medium-risk U.S. corpo-
rations. This spread averaged 139 basis points over the decade. The right-
hand column gives the spread between interest rates on emerging-market
debt issued in dollars or in pounds sterling and those on risk-free bonds
that have the same term and are issued in the same currency. This spread
averaged 261 basis points during the same period. This means that
investors treated emerging-market bonds as 88 percent more risky than
medium-quality U.S. corporate bonds.22
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capital for investment. Table 1 of his paper shows that capital formation as a percentage of
GDP during the 1980s was substantially lower in countries that had debt-servicing prob-
lems than in those that did not. 
21. Eichengreen and Portes (1995) discuss the history and reasons why sovereign debt
is unsecured. 
22. Data on emerging-market bond spreads are taken from Eichengreen and Mody
(2000, table 1). Data for U.S. corporate bond spreads and U.S. government bond yields are
taken from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Note that emerging-
market bonds are a mixture of sovereign bonds and other types of issues, some of which
have explicit or implicit sovereign guarantees. 
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similar to those for companies in Chapter 11. Of three studies of Chap-
ter 11 reorganizations of large U.S. corporations during the 1980s, two
found average payoff rates to unsecured creditors of about 50 cents on the
dollar, and the third found an average payoff rate of 69 cents on the dol-
lar. In contrast, the average secondary market price for bonds of fifteen
highly indebted countries in 1986–88 was 53 cents on the dollar.23 Thus
the difference between the spreads on corporate bonds and those on
emerging-market debt appears to be due entirely to differences in the
probability of default, since the payoff rates conditional on default are
similar. How debtor countries’ default rates compare with the risk pre-
mium on emerging-market debt is a question for future research. 
Current Procedures for Dealing with Sovereign Default
Sovereign debt is divided into four types: loans owed to the interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs; mainly the IMF and the World Bank),
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23. These are noncomparable in the sense that the sovereign debt price depends on both
the probability of default and the amount repaid conditional on default, whereas the corpo-
rate bond payoff is conditional on default only. But the probability of default is close to 1
for these countries. See White (1996a) and Bulow and Rogoff (1988, table 2, p. 680). 
Table 1. Yield Spreads for Medium-Quality U.S. Corporate Bonds 
and Emerging-Market Bonds, 1991–98 
Basis points
Yield spread over risk-free bonds










Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and Eichengreen and Mody
(2000).
a. Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds over thirty-year constant-maturity U.S. Treasury bonds.
b. Selected emerging-market bonds over risk-free bonds of comparable currency and maturity.
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banks, and private loans owed to bondholders.24 By law, all four types
have equal priority in a default, but loans from the IFIs are treated as hav-
ing higher priority and are generally not rescheduled. The Paris Club is
the forum for renegotiating ofﬁcial debt, and the London Club is the
forum for renegotiating commercial bank debt. Paris Club debts are rene-
gotiated ﬁrst. For a country to be eligible for a Paris Club rescheduling,
two conditions must be met. First, the IMF must certify that the country is
unable to meet its debt service obligations, and, second, the country must
conclude an agreement with the IMF specifying policy changes that it will
adopt to avoid a repetition of its ﬁnancial problems. In their negotiations,
sovereign creditors insist on the principle of equitable burden sharing for
both ofﬁcial and private creditors. This is to prevent defaulting countries
from repaying a low fraction of ofﬁcial creditors’ claims and later agree-
ing to repay a higher fraction of commercial creditors’ claims. Traditional
rescheduling terms involve a grace period of ﬁve years and then repay-
ment over the next ﬁve years, but more concessionary terms have become
increasingly common since the late 1980s, particularly for the poorest
countries.25 Paris Club agreements require unanimous consent of the ofﬁ-
cial creditors, but holdouts are not a serious problem, because the credi-
tors are always the same group of large industrial countries and are
experienced in this type of negotiation. Barry Eichengreen and Richard
Portes cite the negotiations over Polish debt in 1990–91, which went on
for ﬁfteen months, as an instance of unusually drawn-out negotiations.26
The IMF waits to disburse new funds to the country until the Paris Club
agreement has been reached. 
The IMF’s role in the Paris Club has no parallel under Chapter 11 and
is likely to reduce moral hazard problems. Countries that are ﬁnancially
able to repay their debts are less likely to default, because of the need for
IMF certiﬁcation that the country is unable to pay its debts (although the
IMF cannot prevent countries from becoming ﬁnancially unable to repay
their debts because of corruption or bad economic policies). Also, the
agreement with the IMF concerning policy changes functions like a reor-
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25. Vitale (1995, pp. 123–26).
26. Eichengreen and Portes (1995).
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and increasing the probability that it will be able to meet its rescheduled
debt obligations. 
The London Club meets after the Paris Club has completed its work.
The main creditors participating are commercial banks. A steering com-
mittee is formed, usually composed of the ﬁfteen banks holding the
largest claims. London Club agreements include a nondiscrimination
clause requiring that the debtor not give more favorable treatment to dis-
sident creditors than to members of the club. In addition, loan agreements
with the commercial banks contain a clause requiring that any creditor
that does receive disproportionately favorable treatment share the pro-
ceeds with other commercial creditors. Another constraint on the negotia-
tions is that the Paris Club’s requirement of equitable burden sharing
prevents the debtor country from giving the commercial bank creditors
more favorable treatment than the ofﬁcial creditors. Thus the combination
of the equitable burden-sharing principle and the nondiscrimination
clause requires that, in theory, all London Club creditors be treated alike
and no better than Paris Club creditors. But, in practice, London Club
creditors probably receive larger payoffs, because Paris Club creditors
often offer easy repayment terms or debt forgiveness for political, envi-
ronmental, or eleemosynary reasons.27
The London Club does not require unanimous consent of all creditors,
but agreements normally involve the consent of holders of 90 to 95 per-
cent of the outstanding debt. Because of this near-unanimity requirement
and the fact that many more creditors are involved in London Club than in
Paris Club negotiations, London Club negotiations tend to be slow. The
London Club negotiations for Poland that started in 1981 took nearly
fourteen years.28 Until 1988 the IMF would not disburse its own funds to
a debtor country until a London Club agreement had been reached, but
then it reversed that policy. Defaulting countries are now able to obtain
IMF disbursements and other multilateral funds even though they have
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27. For example, Honduras and Nicaragua were allowed to defer all debt service pay-
ments for three years following Hurricane Mitch in 1998. 
28. Typical terms in a London Club rescheduling also involve a grace period, fol-
lowed by repayment of principal over a set number of years at an agreed-on interest rate.
The banks lend the amount of interest that would otherwise be due during the grace
period. Because the principal remains the same, banks do not have to classify the loans as
nonperforming. 
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shifted bargaining power in debtor countries’ favor.29
Sachs gives several explanations for why London Club negotiations
during the 1980s were protracted.30 First, for large banks, agreeing to
reduce their claims against one country in default sets a precedent for sim-
ilarly favorable treatment of other countries in default. These banks there-
fore have an incentive to take a tough stance in negotiations for
reputational purposes. Second, in the 1980s, small banks often sold their
sovereign claims at a large discount, which reduced the defaulting coun-
try’s cost of repaying more to the large banks. Similarly, the ofﬁcial cred-
itors often offer favorable repayment terms to defaulting countries, which
also increases defaulting countries’ ability to repay the large banks. Thus,
waiting to be the last creditor to settle with the debtor is often a proﬁtable
strategy for creditors if they can afford to wait. But, as discussed above,
delay is costly to the debtor. Because of their need for new loans, default-
ing countries often make agreements with commercial bank creditors that
are very harsh.31
The last group of sovereign creditors, private bondholders, has become
extremely important. Following the Latin American defaults of the 1980s,
commercial banks’ sovereign loans were rescheduled and converted into
bonds—called Brady bonds—which were sold to private investors. Brady
bonds caused secondary markets for sovereign bonds to develop, and as
of the mid-1990s the number of such bonds had grown to the point where
they constituted two-thirds of emerging-market debt.32
Most sovereign bonds are issued either in the United Kingdom under
U.K. law or in the United States under U.S. law. Bonds issued under U.K.
law contain collective action clauses (CACs), which permit a supermajor-
ity of bondholders—usually 75 percent—voting at a bondholders’ meet-
ing to adopt changes in the terms of the bonds. These changes can include
changes in payment terms. The changes are then binding on all bondhold-
ers. Bonds containing CACs lend themselves to restructuring, because a
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31. Sachs (1989) argues that several of the agreements made by countries in default
with their private creditors during the 1980s were so harsh that the countries defaulted
again a short time later. 
32. See Eichengreen and Mody (2000). The pool of international capital ﬂowing to
emerging markets increased from $188 billion in 1984–90 to more than $1 trillion in
1991–97 but has fallen since then. See Blustein (2001, p. 17).
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contrast, U.S.-issued bonds do not allow their payment terms to be
changed except by unanimous consent. Some sovereign bonds issued in
the United States do incorporate CACs that allow a majority or a super-
majority of bondholders to change the terms of the bond, as long as the
changes do not involve the terms of payment.33 The lack of a collective
action procedure for payment terms makes rescheduling U.S.-issued bonds
more difﬁcult than rescheduling those issued in the United Kingdom. 
U.S.- and U.K.-issued bonds also differ as to whether individual credi-
tors can sue the debtor country following default. In order for litigation
against the debtor to be worthwhile, creditors must be able to accelerate
payments following a default, so that they can sue for the full amount of
principal and interest owed in the future, rather than just for the missed
interest payments. Most U.S.-issued bonds give individual bondholders
the right to accelerate payment following a default. Others require that at
least 25 percent of bondholders agree on an acceleration. In contrast,
U.K.-issued bonds allow only the bond trustee to accelerate payment and
sue the debtor country, and they require that any recovery be shared pro
rata among the bondholders.34 As a result, holders of U.S.-issued bonds
have an incentive to individually sue the defaulting country for repay-
ment, whereas holders of U.K.-issued bonds do not. 
A recent example of a “rogue” creditor who successfully sued a sover-
eign debtor illustrates the potential of creditors who hold U.S.-issued sov-
ereign bonds to disrupt sovereign debt restructurings. Elliott Associates, a
private investment ﬁrm, purchased $20 million worth of U.S.-issued com-
mercial loans that were guaranteed by the Peruvian government. When
Peru later tried to restructure its debt, Elliott Associates sued Peru in U.S.
courts for repayment. It obtained a judgment and an attachment order
against Peruvian funds in the United States and Europe that were intended
to pay interest on Peru’s restructured Brady bonds. Peru then settled the
case, paying Elliott Associates $56 million.35 The fact that Elliott Associ-
ates was so successful will probably encourage others to follow in its
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33. See Buchheit, Gulati, and Mody (2002) for an explanation and history of the U.S.
practice of not allowing bond payment terms to be changed by a supermajority vote of
bondholders. 
34. Buchheit, Gulati, and Mody (2002). 
35. Krueger (2001a).
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bankruptcy procedure. 
Debtor countries choose whether to issue their bonds in the United
States or the United Kingdom. Eichengreen and Mody found that 44 per-
cent of emerging-market bonds were issued in the United Kingdom,
32 percent in the United States, and the remainder in other countries,
mainly Japan and Germany.36 Because sovereign debt restructuring is eas-
ier when bonds contain CACs, a question that arises is, Why don’t coun-
tries issue their debt in the United Kingdom more often? One reason is
that, ex ante, borrowers do not want to draw lenders’ attention to the pos-
sibility of default. On the contrary, they would like to credibly precommit
not to default, and they can do so by choosing to issue in the United
States, where any restructuring will be more difﬁcult.37 Another reason is
that interest rates on emerging-market bonds are generally higher in the
United Kingdom than in the United States, so that issuers probably expect
to pay more if they choose to issue in the United Kingdom. However, a
recent study by Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody found that coun-
tries with high credit ratings paid lower interest rates when they issued
their debt in the United Kingdom, whereas the opposite held for countries
with low credit ratings.38 Thus creditors apparently rewarded the precom-
mitment not to default when it was made by (mainly Latin American)
countries that were viewed as likely to default, while rewarding the deci-
sion to opt for more orderly renegotiation procedures on the part of
(mainly Asian) countries that were viewed as not likely to default.
Finally, based on their experience up to the Argentinean default of 2002,
most sovereign debtors probably expected the IMF to bail them out if they
ran into trouble repaying their debt, so that no restructuring would be
required in any case.
This discussion suggests that growth in the number of sovereign bonds
has made the restructuring of sovereign debt increasingly difﬁcult. Rather
than the clubby discussions among bankers and diplomats at the Paris and
London Clubs, restructuring now involves obtaining the unanimous con-
sent of bondholders who lack even a forum for negotiations. Indeed,
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37. See Povel (1999) for a discussion and models of the precommitment problem. 
38. Eichengreen and Mody (2000).
0675-07 BPEA/White  7/22/02  1:12 PM  Page 305because many sovereign bonds are bearer bonds, bondholders are often
anonymous and impossible to contact. The fact that sovereign debt
restructuring has become so difﬁcult has put increased pressure on the
IMF to bail out countries in ﬁnancial distress. This in turn has led it to
propose reforms that would make the restructuring process quicker and
more orderly. 
Proposals for Reform: Bankruptcy versus 
Nonbankruptcy Approaches
Two recent proposals for reform of current arrangements for distressed
sovereign debtors—by the IMF and by the U.S. Treasury—adopt very
different approaches to the problem.
The IMF’s Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal
In speeches during the fall of 2001, Anne Krueger, ﬁrst deputy manag-
ing director of the IMF, proposed the adoption of a sovereign bankruptcy
procedure.39 Her proposal adopts many of the characteristics of Chapters
11 and 9. First, when countries ﬁle for bankruptcy, there would be an
automatic stay on litigation to discourage grab races and prevent rogue
creditors from disrupting the restructuring process by suing the debtor
country in U.S. courts. Second, priority would be given to new, postbank-
ruptcy private loans. This would make it easier for distressed countries to
obtain new loans and reduce the cost to the IMF of funding bailouts.
Third, there would be a procedure for adoption of a restructuring plan that
would bind both minority creditors within a class of creditors and entire
classes of creditors. As in Chapter 9, public ofﬁcials would remain in
charge during the procedure. However, the proposed sovereign bank-
ruptcy procedure would differ from Chapters 9 and 11 in that the IMF
would have a large role, much as it now has in sovereign debt restructur-
ings. Debtor countries would have to get the IMF’s permission to enter
the sovereign bankruptcy procedure, the IMF would give countries per-
mission to remain in bankruptcy after the initial ninety-day period, the
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39. Krueger (2001a, 2001b). Krueger’s speeches do not provide much in the way of
speciﬁcs, however. Several other authors have made sovereign bankruptcy proposals: see
Sachs (1999), Schwarcz (2000), Chun (1996), and Macmillan (1995). 
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the restructuring procedure takes place, and the IMF would provide cred-
itors with an assessment of whether the proposed restructuring reduces
the country’s debt burden to a sustainable level. The IMF would also pro-
vide new loans to the country.40
A problem with the IMF’s or any other sovereign bankruptcy proposal
is that it would be difﬁcult to implement. No existing court has jurisdic-
tion over disputes between a sovereign state and another country’s citi-
zens (in this case the bondholders). This means that no international court
exists whose functions could be expanded to include adjudicating a sover-
eign bankruptcy.41 As discussed above, sovereign bond contracts always
specify that a particular country’s laws, usually the laws of the United
States or the United Kingdom, govern if disputes occur. In theory this
might mean that creditors could initiate an involuntary bankruptcy ﬁling
in the United States or the United Kingdom for a country that has
defaulted on its debts. But U.S. bankruptcy law does not allow bank-
ruptcy ﬁlings by sovereign states. 
Two different routes to adoption of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure
have been proposed.42 One involves an international treaty that would set
up a sovereign bankruptcy court and would require that private creditors
of a country in bankruptcy use that court rather than their own countries’
courts when disputes occur. The other involves amending Article VIII of
the IMF Articles of Agreement. Article VIII(2)(b) provides that 
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territo-
ries of any member. In addition, members may by mutual accord cooperate in
measures for the purposes of making the exchange control regulations of either
member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are con-
sistent with this Agreement.
Under this approach, the term “exchange contracts” would be broad-
ened to include all contracts. Then, if a member state suspended repay-
ment of its foreign debt with the IMF’s approval, the contract would be
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discusses only the original proposal. 
41. The International Court of Justice in The Hague deals only with disputes between
countries, not between a country and private citizens in another country.
42. See Greenwood and Mercer (1995) and Krueger (2001b).
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VIII would require that three-ﬁfths of the IMF’s member countries, hold-
ing 85 percent of the IMF’s voting power, approve the change. Thus both
routes to adoption of sovereign bankruptcy would be difﬁcult, because
both would require legal changes by a large number of countries. 
Contractual Approaches to Sovereign Default
Alternative proposals for reform of sovereign debt restructuring proce-
dures generally involve changing the form of sovereign debt contracts,
but not adopting a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. These are referred to
as contractual approaches. A recent speech by John Taylor, under secre-
tary of the U.S. Treasury for international affairs, illustrates the contrac-
tual approach.43 His proposal calls for CACs to be incorporated into all
emerging-market bonds, so that a dissenting minority of creditors within
any bond issue could be compelled to agree to a restructuring plan.44 All
bond issues would also contain clauses specifying who would represent
bondholders in restructuring negotiations with the debtor and that only the
bondholders’ representative could initiate litigation against the debtor.
Finally, clauses in all bonds would specify that the sovereign debtor could
initiate a suspension of debt payments for a ﬁxed period prior to the start
of restructuring negotiations. None of these reforms would require statu-
tory changes. However, the IFIs have been advocating similar changes for
the past several years with little effect, suggesting that carrots or sticks
would be needed to induce sovereign debtors to make the changes. Along
these lines, Taylor proposes that the IMF require any country that has an
IMF program to incorporate these clauses into all its sovereign bond
issues or, alternatively, that the IMF reward countries that cooperate by
charging them a lower interest rate on their IMF borrowing.45
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44. The United Kingdom and Canada include CACs in their own sovereign debt, but
Taylor, in response to a question after his speech, indicated that the United States has no
plans to include CACs in U.S. government debt. 
45. Others who have argued in favor of CACs and other contractual changes, but against
adoption of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, include Eichengreen and Portes (1995),
Eichengreen and Ruehl (2000), Buchheit, Gulati, and Mody (2002), and Bartholomew, Liuzzi,
and Stern (2002). Also see Nouriel Roubini’s discussion paper in this symposium. 
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Sovereign Restructuring
How could a sovereign bankruptcy procedure make the sovereign debt
restructuring process more orderly? Would such a procedure increase or
decrease economic efﬁciency? Could the same goals be accomplished
using the contractual approach instead? 
The Moral Hazard Trade-Off
As discussed above, a debtor’s decision to default involves two types
of moral hazard, and adoption of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure
changes the trade-off between them. If default is very hard on ﬁrm man-
agers or public ofﬁcials, they have a strong incentive to avoid it. In their
efforts to avoid default, managers may use the ﬁrm’s assets for very risky
projects, and public ofﬁcials may raise domestic interest rates to very high
levels and cause a severe recession. On the other hand, if managers or
public ofﬁcials are treated more favorably following a default, they may
engage in opportunistic behavior that makes default more likely, such as
using sovereign loans for wasteful purposes. Instituting a sovereign bank-
ruptcy procedure would move the trade-off away from inefﬁcient behav-
ior to avoid default and toward too many defaults. Whether this would
increase or decrease economic efﬁciency is difﬁcult to judge. But if the
sovereign bankruptcy procedure requires that the IMF give the country
permission to default and enter the bankruptcy procedure, any reduction
in economic efﬁciency due to additional default seems likely to be small. 
Controlling Grab Races and Rogue Creditors
A central feature of all forms of bankruptcy is the automatic stay on lit-
igation that takes effect as soon as the debtor ﬁles. The stay both discour-
ages prebankruptcy grab races by creditors and prevents individual
creditors from suing the debtor for full repayment after the bankruptcy ﬁl-
ing. Closing off creditors’ ability to litigate makes it more likely that
restructuring negotiations will be successful, because it reduces creditors’
opportunity cost of accepting a restructuring offer. 
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Debtors in bankruptcy are allowed, with the bankruptcy judge’s per-
mission, to obtain new loans by giving the new lender’s loans priority
over all prebankruptcy loans. These debtor-in-possession loans are rela-
tively easy to arrange in the context of bankruptcy (even Enron obtained
one), because there is a clear legal division between loans made before
and those made after the bankruptcy ﬁling. To the extent that keeping
credit ﬂowing to sovereign borrowers even when they default reduces the
negative effect of default on the debtor country’s economy and popula-
tion, this change would be efﬁciency enhancing. 
Preventing Creditors from Delaying and Preventing Holdouts
A bankruptcy procedure that follows the outlines of Chapter 11 would
give the debtor a number of advantages in the bargaining process over a
restructuring or reorganization plan. First, the debtor would have the
power to compel all creditors to come to the bargaining table at the same
time. In Chapter 11, managers propose the reorganization plan, following
consultation or negotiations with committees that represent different
classes of creditors. All creditors then must vote on the plan. This means
that all classes of creditors must either participate in the bargaining
process or risk being compelled to accept a plan that emerges without
their participation. Individual creditors or classes of creditors do not have
the option of delaying negotiations in hopes of obtaining a better agree-
ment with the debtor after other creditors have settled, because the plan, if
adopted, would resolve their claims. Second, managers have the right to
propose at least the initial plan, whereas creditors can only accept or
reject it. The right to make an offer rather than have to accept or reject
another’s offer allows managers to capture additional surplus.46 These
provisions, if applied to a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, would give
debtors greater bargaining power vis-à-vis creditors than they have out-
side of bankruptcy. 
Chapter 11 also incorporates provisions for overriding both dissenting
minorities within creditor classes and entire dissenting classes. As dis-
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strong majority of each class of creditors to compel a dissenting minority
within any class to agree to the plan. Thus the voting procedure for a
reorganization plan in bankruptcy in effect incorporates CACs into each
bond issue, regardless of whether the original bond issue contained them
or not. In addition, if some classes of creditors reject the plan, the bank-
ruptcy judge can override the dissenting classes and adopt the plan any-
way using cramdown. The cramdown procedure used in Chapter 11
reorganization allows a plan to be adopted even if only one class of cred-
itors votes in favor of it by the required supermajority. If a similar form
of cramdown were incorporated into a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, it
would go far beyond CACs in giving the debtor power to compel hold-
outs to agree to a plan. 
As discussed above, cramdown is only one alternative procedure that
could be used to compel dissenting classes of creditors to agree to a
restructuring plan. Another possibility is for the bankruptcy judge to order
a sovereign liquidation under a procedure like Chapter 7. Because the
payoff to creditors in a sovereign liquidation would be very low, the
prospect of liquidation would serve as a penalty to be levied on all credi-
tors for failing to agree on a restructuring plan. It would give them a
strong incentive both to participate in restructuring negotiations and to
moderate their demands. But a sovereign liquidation, if it occurred, could
also penalize debtors. The loss to a country of its external assets would be
costly even if their value were low, and credit markets might punish sov-
ereign debtors more for a sovereign debt liquidation than for a sovereign
debt restructuring.
Thus a sovereign bankruptcy procedure—if it followed the outlines of
Chapter 11—would increase the debtor country’s bargaining power with
respect to its creditors by forcing all creditors to negotiate simultaneously,
to accept or reject the debtor’s offer, and to accept a restructuring plan
even when they would prefer to hold out. Not surprisingly, creditors are
against the adoption of sovereign bankruptcy, because they feel that they
are better off under the status quo.47 Whether sovereign lending by private
bondholders would survive the adoption of a sovereign bankruptcy proce-
dure is an open question. 
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Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Could reforms that stop short of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure
improve the process of sovereign debt restructuring? If so, how? Most of
the discussion here concerns contractual rather than statutory changes,
such as widespread use of CACs in sovereign debt. But statutory reforms
that involve changing only the laws of the United States or the United
Kingdom or other money center countries are also considered. 
Preventing Litigation by Individual Creditors
The problem of individual creditors acting as holdouts in the restruc-
turing process and suing the debtor for full repayment could be addressed
in simpler ways than creating a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. As dis-
cussed above, sovereign bonds issued under the laws of the United King-
dom generally contain clauses that prevent individual creditors from
accelerating their claims and suing the debtor following default. If all sov-
ereign debtors included these clauses in all of their debt issues, as in Tay-
lor’s proposal,48 individual creditors would be barred from suing the
debtor both before and after default. However, this approach would not
prevent a trustee who represented a majority of holders of a particular
bond issue from suing the debtor. In addition, because many long-term
sovereign bonds were issued in the United States and do not contain
CACs, this solution could have a long transition period. 
A recently developed contractual technique for dealing with bonds
that do not contain CACs is exchange offers combined with exit con-
sents.49 Many U.S. bonds allow 25 percent or more of the holders of a
bond issue to agree on an acceleration of claims, but they also allow a
simple majority of creditors to rescind any previously agreed-on acceler-
ation. If creditors have accelerated their claims or if the sovereign debtor
fears that they might, the debtor can offer bondholders a voluntary
exchange of new bonds for old, combined with a set of amendments to
the terms of the old bonds, referred to as exit consents. Bondholders who
accept the exchange offer automatically vote for the amendments, which
become binding as long as the required majority or supermajority of old
312 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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son the old bonds, both by rescinding any previously agreed-on accelera-
tion of payments and by changing other nonpayment terms to make the
old bonds less valuable. As an example, an amendment might drop the
requirement that the bond issue be publicly listed, so that the old bonds
become unmarketable. By making the terms of the old bonds worse, the
exit consents give bondholders an incentive to accept the exchange. A
standard prisoners’ dilemma argument suggests that individual bond-
holders have an incentive to accept the exchange as long as they expect
other bondholders to accept, even if accepting it makes them worse off.
The reason is that if they do not accept and the exchange succeeds any-
way, they will be even worse off. 
But exchange offers and exit consents may not be as effective as their
advocates argue. If bondholders are difﬁcult to reach because bonds are in
bearer form or if a large majority must accept the exchange, an exchange
offer may fail. In fact, when Ecuador used an exchange offer in 2000 to
modify the terms of its U.S.-issued bonds, it offered substantial ﬁnancial
enhancements to those who accepted, including cash payment of accrued
but unpaid interest and a shorter term to maturity.50 Whether the exchange
would have succeeded without these sweeteners is unclear, since the tech-
nique is new. Thus, contractual approaches to preventing litigation may
either fail or succeed but be very costly to the debtor. 
An alternative approach would be for the United States and the United
Kingdom to change their laws governing sovereign immunity. Both coun-
tries adopted legislation in the 1970s that narrowed their deﬁnitions of
sovereign immunity to exclude sovereigns’ commercial assets.51 If this
legislation were reversed, creditors would have nothing to gain from pur-
suing litigation against sovereign debtors—either individually or as a
class.52 Because these changes would only involve reforming the law in
the United States or the United Kingdom, they would be much simpler to
implement than a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. 
Finally, an even simpler solution would be for sovereign debtors to
avoid holding assets in the United States or the United Kingdom. Sover-
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50. A similar exchange offer by Pakistan also included ﬁnancial incentives. See IMF
(2001), boxes 2.2 and 2.4, pp. 5 and 7–8. 
51. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was adopted in 1976, and the U.K.
State Immunity Act in 1978. See Kaletsky (1985, p. 22). 
52. This has been suggested by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Rogoff (1999). 
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broad deﬁnition of sovereign immunity. 
Preventing Holdouts by Using CACs
If all bond issues had CACs, sovereign debtors would have the power
to prevent a minority of creditors within each bond issue from acting as
holdouts, as long as the required supermajority within each bond issue
was willing to accept a restructuring plan. However, even with CACs,
bondholders cannot be forced to accept a restructuring offer if the group
of bondholders that prefers to hold out is larger than the number required
to block agreement (usually one-fourth in U.K.-issued sovereign bonds).
Similarly, even if all bond issues contained CACs, bondholders could not
be forced to come to the bargaining table if the group of bondholders that
prefers to delay negotiations is larger than the blocking minority. Thus
CACs by themselves do not prevent holdouts and do not give the debtor
the power to force all bondholders to participate in negotiations, if the dis-
senting minority is large enough. 
An additional problem with CACs is that individual bondholders can
easily defeat them by purchasing at least a blocking minority of any par-
ticular bond issue. In the future, creditors may demand that debtors pro-
vide many smaller bond issues, or may demand that the blocking majority
be reduced in size, so that investors can count on controlling any bond
issue they purchase.53 Another problem is that if more bond issues in the
future contain CACs, creditors’ gain from holding bond issues that do not
contain CACs will rise. Being a holdout becomes more proﬁtable the
fewer the number of other potential holdouts, because the sovereign
debtor is more likely to buy out holdouts when they are few. Thus credi-
tors may defeat attempts to make CACs universal by offering better terms
on sovereign bond issues that do not contain them or by buying only small
issues in which they can purchase a majority.54 In effect, the market may
defeat attempts to make CACs universal.
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53. However, if bond issues are too small, they become unmarketable.
54. See Bartholomew, Liuzzi, and Stern (2002) for a proposal that sovereign debtors
begin a restructuring by making an exchange offer that would consolidate all of the sover-
eign debtor’s existing bond issues into a single set of new bond issues. Exit consents would
be used to poison all of the old bond issues. But even this proposal, which would be costly
to the debtor, would not deal with bond issues in which a holdout debtor controlled a block-
ing minority. 
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with bond issues in which CACs are ineffective because the group of dis-
senters is too large. But, again, exchange offers are likely to be very
costly to the debtor. 
Debtor-in-Possession Financing without Bankruptcy
Finally, can contractual reforms make it possible for sovereign debtors
to obtain new loans when default is likely or has already occurred (that is,
debtor-in-possession  ﬁnancing without bankruptcy)? The new creditor
would presumably require that its loan take priority over all the debtor’s
previous loans, perhaps with the exception of loans from the IFIs. Such a
violation of equal priority would change the terms of all prior bond issues
and would require unanimous consent of all bond issues. For bond issues
containing CACs, approval would require a supermajority vote of bond-
holders. For U.S.-issued bonds, the same type of approval would be
needed, since this change does not alter the terms of payment of the bond.
Thus a majority or supermajority of each bond issue would have to con-
sent. Presumably most bond issues would consent, particularly if the IMF
also offered new ﬁnancing on condition of priority for the new private
loan. However, at least some bond issues are likely to act as holdouts and
not agree to the change, because suing the debtor for full repayment
would be more ﬁnancially attractive after the country received the new
loans. But without unanimous consent of all prior bond issues, the priority
status of the new loan would be in doubt, and thus private new loans
would not likely be available. Overall, it seems unlikely that contractual
changes short of adopting a sovereign bankruptcy procedure would be
sufﬁcient to allow sovereign debtors to obtain new private loans once
default has become likely or has already occurred. CACs cannot substi-
tute for bankruptcy along this dimension. 
Fairness
A ﬁnal issue is how CACs or a sovereign bankruptcy procedure would
affect the fairness of payoffs to creditors following default. In other
words, do all creditors take an equal haircut because they have equal pri-
ority? Under a contractual system involving CACs, creditors’ returns
across bond issues are likely to vary considerably, depending on whether
individual creditors have majority control of their bond issues and
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turing plan. In contrast, under a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, debtors
would have greater bargaining power and could probably compel bond
issues to agree to haircuts that are more uniform. 
Conclusion
Do sovereign states in ﬁnancial distress need a sovereign bankruptcy
procedure to accomplish an orderly restructuring, that is, to prevent indi-
vidual lawsuits against the debtor, compel dissenting minority and major-
ity groups of creditors to negotiate over and accept a restructuring plan,
and allow the sovereign debtor to obtain new private loans following
default? I have argued that contractual changes short of bankruptcy, such
as incorporating CACs in sovereign bond issues, are unlikely to accom-
plish these goals. Although CACs allow the debtor to compel a minority
of holders of any bond issue to accept changes in the terms of their bonds,
they do not allow the debtor to override holdout groups that are larger
than a blocking minority of any particular bond issue. Exchange offers
can overcome this problem for individual bond issues but are likely to
have a very high cost. However, a sovereign bankruptcy procedure could
accomplish all three goals at relatively low cost to the debtor country. 
Thus adoption of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure would improve
efﬁciency by reducing the high costs of default to sovereign debtors’
economies and their citizens’ welfare. But such a procedure could be
overkill in that it might dry up the sovereign bond market completely. 
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